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Abstract
After  authoritarian  periods  of  human  rights  abuses  by  the  state,  trust  in
institutions is likely to have eroded among most citizens. 
One way to try to re-establish this trust – which many researchers believe is
essential to make democracy work – is to hold those responsible accountable in
criminal trials. But to what extent do such trials affect public confidence, and how
does the role of trials relate to other trust-building measures?
These questions were examined by looking at institutional trust in Argentina,
where there have been several different periods after the dictatorship with distinct
approaches  to  criminal  accountability.  Surveys  measuring  the  trust  in  different
institutions  from 1984 until  2015 was  analysed,  and in-depth  interviews  were
conducted  with  strategically  selected  citizens,  in  order  to  explore  the  possible
reasoning behind the responses in the surveys.
The results  indicate that trials  may have a significant positive influence on
institutional  trust.  The trust  is  supported by a  sense of  vindication  among  the
affected citizens, as well as by the fact that the state has acknowledged that the
past abuses were unacceptable. 
Yet, successful institutional reforms seem to be an important precondition in
order for this effect to develop and maintain itself.
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1 Introduction
During  the  dictatorship  in  Argentina  thousands  of  people  were  murdered  or
”disappeared” – something which usually meant that the body was thrown into the
sea or buried in an unmarked mass-grave. Torture, arbitrary detentions and the
kidnapping of babies were other common methods used in order to  “eliminate”
the guerilla and its suspected sympathizers (Sikkink 2008 p. 3-5, Mc Guire 1996
p.178).
Even though the military junta was primarily responsible for the abuses, other
institutions, such as the police, the judiciary and the media, were also complicit –
in some cases to a great extent.
How can the trust – which, according to many researchers, is crucial to make a
democracy work – be restored after such violations?
A scholarship from SIDA gave me the possibility to examine this question by
doing a field study in Buenos Aires in the spring and early summer of 2015.
1.1 Aim
During and after a societal trauma, such as the human rights abuses in Argentina,
the  trust  of  citizens  in  the  public  institutions  is  likely  to  have  decreased
significantly1 (See Sztompka 1999 p. 149).
As  the  journey  towards  democracy  begins,  several  measures  are  usually
recommended in order to restore the trust, respect for human rights and rule of
law, under the label of transitional justice  (Lessa 2011 p.27). 2 
One of those measures is the criminal  prosecution of human rights crimes.
Even  though  earlier  research  has  indicated  that  such  proceedings  constitute  a
crucial contribution to democracy3, there is also an influential body of research
arguing  against criminal  trials  or  at  least  against  the  importance  of  criminal
accountability (Thoms et al. 2010 p. 333-334). My impression is that this research
1Even though this lack of trust obviously varies among the citizens, depending for example on moral 
conceptions, to what extent they are informed about the abuses, to what extent the institutions took part in the 
abuses,  and the seriousness of the crimes.
2Which will hereby be named as TJ.
3See for example Olsen et al.  2010 p. 980.
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often tends to overlook the perspective of the victims, as well as that of other
affected citizens, thereby also overlooking the issue of trust in this context.
The basic aim of this thesis is to empirically examine how criminal prosecutions
for human rights violations may influence the level of institutional trust.
The primary research question may be stated as follows: 
How may trials for serious human rights violations, committed in the past,
affect the citizens' trust in key democratic institutions? 
In order  to  be able  to  try  to answer this  question,  intensive and extensive
methods  will  be  combined  within  this  case  study  of  Argentina  (Teorell  &
Svensson 2007 p. 13, 267, 272). The objective here is to investigate whether the
empirical data supports the claim that criminal prosecutions influence the level of
institutional trust, as well as contribute to a richer understanding of the underlying
reasons and mechanisms. 
Earlier  research  has  suggested  that  prosecutions  may  help  restore  institutional
trust,  since they help re-build norms that  were violated in the past, as well  as
demonstrating that no-one is above the law. It has also been argued that trust is
brought  about  by  giving  the  victims,  as  well  as  other  citizens,  their  sense  of
dignity back (Roht-Arriaza 1995 p. 9, De Greiff 2014 p. 25, Van Zyl 2011 p.211,
Malammud-Goti 1995 p.200).
The question here is to what extent this holds true for Argentina, and how
much other, less expected factors have to be taken into account. 
Based on previous research, it is reasonable to expect that the effects of criminal
proceedings will have an immediate effect, as they contribute to the replacement
of  key  figures,  demonstrating  that  everyone  is  accountable  for  serious  human
rights violations.4 At the same time, norm change within the institutions, as well as
the increased sense of dignity among citizens, are effects which can be expected
to come about more gradually.   
Similarly,  when trials are no longer possible because of amnesty laws, this
should be expected to have a negative effect. But this effect is probably rather
slow and gradual.
Different TJ measures relate closely to each other,  and they often complement
each  other,  according to  many researchers  and TJ  practitioners  (Leebaw 2008
p.103, ICTJ 2016).
Therefore, even when focusing on the trials, other TJ measures will also, to
some extent, be analysed in this thesis, such as especially the purging of former
perpetrators, structural reforms of institutions together with truth commissions and
other truth-seeking measures. 
The purging of former human rights abusers, as well as others reforms created
in order to prevent that the repetition of past abuses are thought to create trust by
demonstrating  that  the  concerned  institutions  are  committed  to  human  rights
4A certain effect might be visible already before  the actual trials, as people are being investigated and 
prosecuted, or  simply because many citizens are aware that some form of criminal proceedings will take place.
6
values, and that “the state officials are public servants” (De Greiff 2014 p. 3, 26).
While the purging is a measure that very directly affects the functioning of an
institution, other reforms intended to change its role, will probably have a more
gradual influence on the level of trust, corresponding to the gradual change.
Truth commissions, and similar truth-seeking measures,  have been thought to
create  trust,  not  only  by  revealing  the  true  facts,  but  also  by  promoting
reconciliation and by valuing and including the stories of the victims (Horne 2014
p. 231). Since this process usually comes about gradually, the effects on the trust
are likely to be fairly gradual as well.
Economic compensation may create trust since it provides a clear recognition
of past abuses (See Roht-Arriaza 1995 p. 9). Yet, as this measure in itself normally
doesn't meet the victims' demand for justice, the positive influence is expected to
be limited (See Böhmer 2014 p. 127). Since the process of getting compensation
can be slow, the expected effect on the trust is also expected to be gradual. 
Even if very schematic, the table below illustrates some general expectations
about  the  influence  of  some  TJ  measures  on  the  restoration  of  trust  in  an
institution (given, of course, that the measures are implemented properly). 
Trial Truth
commission
Purging Role-Change Economic
reparations
Time Immediate Gradual Immediate Gradual Gradual
Effect Medium Medium Medium Medium Low
1.2 Structure of the thesis
After  the  chapters  on theory and methodology,  the role  of  each  institution
during the dictatorship will be presented, as well as to what extent each institution
has been able to break with the past.
In  relation  to  those  parameters,  the  trust  in  key democratic  institutions  in
Argentina from the fall of the dictatorship 1983 until 2015 will be estimated and
analysed. 
Argentina is rather unique in that there have been several distinct periods after
the dictatorship with different approaches to the issues of criminal accountability
(ICTJ 2008). 
The focus will therefore be on the corresponding periods of changes.
Finally, the results will be analysed and discussed more generally with regard
to previous research and possible future studies.
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2 Theoretical background
2.1 The importance of trust to make democracy 
work
Margaret Levi  (1998 p.  78) has defined trust  as “a variety of phenomena that
enable  individuals  to  take  risks  in  dealing  with  others,  solve  collective  action
problems,  or  act  in  ways  that  seem  contrary  to  standard  definitions  of  self-
interest.”
Its relation to democracy is a complex one (Warren 1999 p.1). On the one
hand, a certain distrust, is a healthy and natural part of democracy. Yet, a society
with little  or no willingness to cooperate  will  have severe difficulties  to make
democracy work in practice (See  Putnam 1993 p. 191-192, 208, Letki 2009 p.
162-163, Sztompka 1999 p. 140, 147-148).
Even though there is no complete consensus, many scholars have stressed that
not  just  inter-personal,  but  also  trust  in  the  key  institutions  is  necessary  in  a
democratic society.5 
Since  democracy  requires  participation  as  well  as  information,  a  certain
amount of trust is required in the political regime, in the fairness of the rules, as
well as a belief in the general credibility of the media (Sztompka 1999 p. 147-
148). According to Levi, trust in the state seems to generate inter-personal trust
which in turn will increase the chances of cooperation and compliance (Levi 1998
p. 85, 89).    
This trust is created if the state demonstrates fairness: by having institutions
that  are  impartial  and keep their  promises,  that  conditions  are  created  so that
everyone comply with the rules, and that citizens can participate in the making of
decisions (Levi 1998 p. 90).
5See for example  Sztompka 1999 p. 147, Warren 1999 p.6, Hetherington 1998 p.792.
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2.2 Transitional justice
Transitional justice has been defined as “the conception of justice in periods of
political change” (Teitel 2000 p.3). Often, this change has implied a transition to
democracy (Leebaw 2008 p.102).  Yet,  also other  goals  have  been pronounced
such as reconciliation,  peace and non-repetition  (Bonner 2009 p.  237, Leebaw
2008 p. 96, Laplante 2009 p. 917).
The phenomena is not new: Jon Elster mentions the transitions to democracy
in Athens 404 and 411 before Christ as examples of TJ (Leebaw 2008 p. 98-99).
Yet, the term itself was not invented until in the middle of the 1990's, as a result of
that the debate emerged on how countries in transitions during the 1980's and the
beginning of 1990's should deal with the violations made in the past (Lessa 2011
p. 27).
Even though many have claimed that the goals of TJ are possible to achieve in
practice,  others  have  also  claimed  the  opposite  (Thoms  et  al.  2010  p.  330).
According  to  Thoms  et  al.  (2010  p.  330)  more  empirical  evidence  is  needed
concerning the effects of TJ since many claims “appears to be based more on faith
than on facts” (2010 p. 331).6
Yet,  some empirical studies have obviously been made, and most of them
seem to point in the direction that TJ measures have positive effects or no effects
at all – at least on the state-level.7 Yet, there is not yet enough support for strong
and general claims in either direction (Thoms et al. 2010 p. 351).
2.3 Human rights trials
As mentioned above, trials have been thought to, among other things,  promote
democracy and respects for human rights besides the fundamental principles of
rule of law. They have been believed to do so for a number of reasons: by the
deterrence effect it might have, which would prevent similar crimes in the future,
by breaking the cycle of impunity, by moderating the desire for revenge and by
making victims feel more secure (Roht-Arriaza 1995 p. 8, Mihai 2010 p. 112).
 But many difficulties have also been recognized within the research literature.
One such difficulty is that the justice system in a transitional country,  probably
lacks both independence and strength, as Roht-Arrianza (1995 p. 286) writes:
6See also Olsen  et al. 2010 p. 981.
7Olsen et al. (2010 p. 980) found that trials in combination with amnesties and truth commissions had a positive 
effect on democracy and human rights. Kim and Sikkink (2010 p.939)  found that countries where trials had 
been made were less repressive than those where no trials had been made.  Sikking and Walling (2007 p. 427) 
found results that indicated that  human rights trials had no negative effect on democracy and human rights. 
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“A transitional government may take years to build – or rebuild – a judiciary
and  courts  with  both  the  ability  and  the  independence  to  render  respected
decisions in human rights cases, especially where there may be so many as to
overwhelm the system.”
The citizens  might  perceive  the trials  as politically  influenced in  countries
where there has been no tradition of independence in the judiciary,  she writes.
This is a dilemma since the trials at the same time should be done soon after the
return of democracy in order to be effective (Roht-Arriaza 1995 p. 286). 
Another issue, which has often been discussed, is that trials may threaten the
stability of an often fragile transitional regime, e.g. by new coup-attempts  (Roht-
Arriaza  1995  p.  286).  This  has  led  some  to  argue  against  the  use  of  trials
altogether  (Thoms  2010  p.  334).  This  debate,  about  weather  to  “punish  or
pardon”, was very much present during the third wave of democratization in Latin
America, and amnesties were many times seen as a way to negotiate peace as well
as democracy (Laplante 2009 p. 916).
2.4 Trust within the context of transitional justice
As mentioned  before,  several  scholars  have  argued  that  trials  have  an  effect,
which  indirectly  influences,  or  is  closely  related  to,  the  issue  of  trust.   Some
scholars have also explicitly claimed that trials, as well as other TJ measures, may,
more or less directly, create or improve the institutional trust in a society dealing
with past human rights abuses (Goti-Malamud 1995 p. 200, De Greiff 2014 p. 25,
Horne 2014 p. 226).
At the same time, this potential for creating trust clearly does not necessarily
mean that  this  will  actually happen in practice.   The lack of empirical  studies
concerning the effects of TJ measures mentioned in the previous section is even
more salient in relation to institutional trust, even though some such studies have
been made. For example Cardenas et al. (2015 p.515) found results that indicated
that  those in Chile who approved of the work of the National Commission of
Truth and Reconciliation were also more trustful of institutions. Cynthia M Horne
(2014 p. 225) could similarly see a positive relationship between “lustration” and
trust in institutions in Central and Eastern Europe.
10
2.5 Democratic institutions
As Richard Rose writes, not only a freely elected government and parliament
are  necessary  in  a  democracy.   A precondition  for  a  democracy  to  actually
function is also the rule of law which will impede the governors to “act according
to their whims and interests” (Rose 2009  p. 12).
“In a rule of law state the constitution not only sets up what governors can do
but also what they cannot do – and it is enforced” (Rose 2009 p.12).
In  addition,  many  scholars,  such  as  e.g.  Robert  Dahl,  have  stressed  the
importance of freedom of expression and alternative sources of information in a
functioning democratic state (Bernhagen 2009 p. 28-29). An important institution
is therefore an independent media. How can fair and free elections be held if there
is no trustworthy information about what different political alternatives there are?
(Voltmer and Rawnsley 2009 p.234-235). 
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3 Methodology
3.1 The case study
Argentina  was  chosen  for  this  case  study since  it  has  gone  through  different
political  periods  with  radically  different  approaches  to  the  issue  of  criminal
accountability in relation to human rights abuses during the dictatorship (ICTJ
2008, Teorell & Svensson 2007 p. 152).
The aspect which is of primary interest here:  i.e. trials for past human rights
abuses  has  been  a  common  thread  in  many  countries  in  transition  or  post-
transition to democracy (Kim & Sikkink 2010 p. 939). The history of Argentina
may from that perspective be seen as a fairly typical case, in the sense that general
conclusions about the effects of trials should be valid for many other countries as
well (see e.g. Teorell & Svensson 2007 p.151- 152).
 
3.2 Combining extensive and intensive methods
For  this  study,  it  was  not  practically  possible  to  do  extensive  statistical
investigations as a complement to the more detailed case study. Nor did I find any
extensive  study which  could  be  explicitly  connected  to  the  research  question.
Instead, survey data from several different sources concerning public trust in the
Argentinian institutions have been aggregated and used.
By also using extensive survey data, the aim is to estimate the general level of
institutional trust among the citizens in Argentina and how it has varied over time
(see Teorell & Svensson 2007 p. 267, Esaiasson et al. 2012 p. 229). 
Based on the results from those surveys, 15 people were interviewed, in order
to get a richer understanding about the thinking behind the survey answers, as
well as being able to further investigate the role of the trials and the trust in this
context (see Esaiasson et al. 2012 p. 229). 
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3.3 The surveys
The survey data mainly derives from the database World Values Survey, since they
had comparable data from the different periods from 1984 until nowadays, and
from Latinobarómetro, which has detailed data from almost every year during the
period 1995-2015 (World Values Survey 2016, Latinobarómetro 2016).
In addition different surveys made by companies such as Gallup and Graciela
Römer y Asociados were used.8
In order to be able to compare the different  surveys,  I  have simplified the
answers9 and put them into one chart for each institution.10  Some surveys posed
different questions though, and were therefore not directly comparable with the
other data. Because of that they were analysed separately. 
Unfortunately,  data  wasn't  available  for  every year  and institution  between
1983 and 2015. Yet, by putting different surveys together it is still possible to get a
sufficiently clear picture.
The survey data indicates the public trust in different institutions, but does not
directly indicate the possible relationship between that trust and the trials. Even
though it will not be possible to isolate the possible effect of the trials from other
variables,  it  should  be  possible  to  at  least  see  some  possible  patterns  and
indications (See Teorell & Svensson 2007 s. 64). 
3.4 Interviews
Qualitative semi-structured interviews have been used in this study. The aim of
this  method is  to  be able  to  see possible  patterns  since all  interviews  will  be
organized around the same, already prepared, questions. At the same time, this
method gives the possibility to also get unexpected answers, and to pose further
questions when needed (Di-Cicco-Bloom & Crabtree 2006 p. 315-316).
The  choice  of  the  interviewees  was  made  strategically,  based  on  the
information from the surveys (see Esaiasson 2012 p. 260-262). After having made
a preliminary  investigation  of  the  survey data,  interviewees  were  chosen with
respect to different social backgrounds, political views and ages, since the survey
material indicated that the answers differed depending on those characteristics. 11
When it comes to age, I wanted the majority to be at least 45 years, so that they
8The surveys used as a complement to the data of World Values Survey and Latinobarómetro were: Gallup 
1996a, Gallup/CIMA 2001, Gallup/La Nación 2001, Graciela Römer y Asociados 1996a, Nueva Mayoría/La 
Nación 1996
9Some surveys had different alternatives for those who trusted an institution, such as ”quite a lot” and ”a lot”. 
These two were put together in order to be able to compare them with those surveys which only had one 
alternative for those who trusted the institution. 
10In the survey from Graciela  Römer there was sometimes different data from the same year. In order to be able 
to compare it to the other data, I used their mean value. (Graciela Römer y Asociados 1996a)
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would  be  able  to  remember  the  dictatorship.  Apart  from  that,  I  also  wanted
variation  concerning  weather  the  interviewees  had  been  affected  by  the
dictatorship or not.
This is mainly a so-called “respondent study”; it's the thought and reasoning of
the interviewees which is the focus of interest here, not to use them as sources of
information in an objective sense (Esaiasson et al. 2012 p. 227-228). 12 
At the same time, it's obviously important that the answers really correspond
to how the respondents thought and felt in the past. This can be a challenge, as
Tove Lindén (2008) states in the thesis  Explaining Civil Society Core Activism in
Post-Soviet Latvia.  Her method to try to overcome these difficulties, which was
also used here, was to start by asking more general questions; such as where the
interviewee was doing and where she or he lived during this time (Lindén 2008 p.
72).
There  are  also  other  difficulties  that  deserve  mention.  One  is  that  the
researcher takes a role in the process when doing interview in another way than
when one makes a survey, that ”the knowledge produced in a research interview is
constituted by the interaction itself ” (Kvale 2007 s. 14).  
In my case for example, the fact that I come from a context which culturally is
slightly different and that Spanish is not my mother tongue might have effected
the answers I got. 13
The ethical aspect is obviously also important. This is perhaps especially true
when the theme of the interview, as in this case, can awake painful memories.
I had decided to keep some distance and be careful not to ask too sensitive
questions. In the end, no such situations occurred though (see Di Cissi Bloom &
Crabtree 2006 s. 319, Kvale 2007 s. 29-30).
3.5 Definitions 
The definitions  are based on the theoretical  background mentioned above, and
they  have  been  adopted  as  functional  analytical  tools  for  this  specific  study
(Teorell & Svensson 2007 p. 40).
11This conclusion was made after having made a ”pilotstudy”  of data from World Values Survey. The trust in the 
armed forces,the press and the parliament during different periods were crosstabulated with variables such as 
age, selfposition on a political scale, region, size of town, habitat, education and social class.
12Some expert interviews were also made. With those interviews I obviously had another aim. 
13In order to prevent misinterpretations because of the language, all interviews were recorded. 
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3.5.1 Democratic institutions
My choice of key democratic institutions are the following:
 The government.
 The parliament.
 The judiciary.
 The armed forces
 The police.
 The media.
This  choice  is  primarily  based  on the  theoretical  discussion  about  democracy
above.  Not  only  representatives  of  the  people  are  necessary in  order  to  make
democracy work. Institutions that ensure that the rule of law is enforced are just as
important. Here the judiciary, the police, and to some extent also the military play
a key role.
The media must also be seen as a key democratic  institution as it  informs
people about the different political  alternatives as well as the behaviour of the
other institutions. 
3.5.2 Institutional trust
With  the  theoretical  discussion  above  in  mind,  it  is  important  to  leave  the
definition of institutional trust somewhat open, since slightly different perceptions
may exist among respondents. This should not be a problem for validity, since the
intuitive understanding of “trust”, will usually be sufficient (see Esaiasson et al.
2012 p. 59).
Also it is worth noting that in the World Values Survey, the word “confidence”
was used instead of trust.  Yet,  as the question is likely to have been posed in
Spanish from the beginning, it is probable that the word “confianza” was after all
used in all surveys.14
3.5.3 Trials
The word “trials” in this study refers to the criminal prosecution of serious human
rights abuses. Unless explicitly stated, proceedings within the national judiciary
are implied, since the role of international tribunals is beyond the scope of this
study. 
14”Confianza” in Spanish may mean ”trust” as well as ”confidence” (Blank et al. 2002 p.116). 
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4 Different periods of criminal 
accountability
After  an  increased  activity  by  right  wing  death  squads,  as  well  as  by  leftist
guerilla  groups,  the  government  of  María  Estela  Martínez  de  Perón  was
overthrown by the military in 1976. A program was initiated where many forms of
inhumane  methods  were  used  in  a  systematic  manner  in  order  to  repress
opposition (Sikkink 2008 p.3-4). According to the truth commission, almost 9000
deaths  and disappearances  took place between 1975 and 1983,15 while  several
organizations  have  estimated  the  number  to  be  even  higher  (ICTJ  2008  p.1,
Sikkink 2008 p. 3-4). 
Before leaving power, the military tried to give itself amnesty for the crimes
committed. But those amnesties were declared invalid shortly after the new civil
government had taken power in 1983 (Zalaquett 1995 p. 23).
4.1 The fall of the dictatorship and the first trials 
1983-1985
Raúl  Alfonsín  (from the  party  Union  cívica  radical)  who  during  his  election
campaign had promised to  bring to  justice those responsible  for human rights
crimes, came to power in 1983. The same year he passed a decree that the top
military commanders  would be put on trial  16 17 Two years  later,  five of them
where sentenced to prison (Zalaquett 1995 p. 23, Sikkink 2008 p.6-10).
The truth commission  Nunca Más was also created in 1984, which became
“the  public  truth”  about  the  system of  disappearances  that  had  been  in  place
during the dictatorship (Crenzel 2014 p. 43).
 
15Most of them took place in 1976 and 1977 (Sikkink 2008 p.3).
16He also ordered a decree declaring the necessity to prosecute the leaders of the left-winged guerilla groups 
Monteneros and  ERP (Zalaquett 1995 p. 23).
17Data from 1983 also indicates that the majority of the citizens wanted the crimes to be investigated
(Crenzel 2015 p. 87).
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4.2 The amnesty laws and the pardons of sentenced 
commanders (1986-1991)
 Pressure from the military led to the passing of two amnesty laws, while Alfonsín
was still in power. 
The first law, punto final, (“Full Stop”) was adopted in 1986. This law meant
that prosecutors had a deadline of sixty days – starting from the implementation of
the law – to bring a case of those already accused of human rights abuses. After
that deadline, this was no longer possible ( ICTJ 2008 p.1-3).
The  second  one,  adopted  in  1987,  was  called  Obediencia  Debida (“Due
Obedience”.)  This  law provided that  most  people involved,  except  the highest
commanders, could not be prosecuted because they had only obeyed orders and
that they had been acting in the belief that what they did was legal. 
The two amnesty laws did exclude kidnapping of children and falsification of
their papers, and Obedencia Debida also excluded the rape of children.
Hundreds  of  persons,  who  had  been  denounced  and  in  several  cases  also
prosecuted for crimes against human rights during the dictatorship, benefited from
these laws (Abuelas de playa de Mayo et al. 1988 p. 7).18
Despite  the  adoption  of  the  amnesties,  the  discontent  from  the  military
continued. Therefore,  in January 1991 the new president Carlos Ménem issued
pardons for the sentenced top commanders, as well as for the few individuals who
were still being investigated ( ICTJ 2008 p.1-3, Filippini 2011 p.24). 
The new laws in combination with the pardoning of perpetrators, meant that
the 90:s was an era of relative impunity (ICTJ2008 p.1-3). Yet, some important
accountability measures were taken, which were many times consequences of the
continued work of the human rights movement. During the second half of 1990,
“truth trials”19 were being held and two former members of the first military junta
were arrested, since they had committed crimes which were not covered by the
amnesty laws (Sikkink 2008 p.12-13).
18The big majority of those persons belonged to the military and the police. (Abuelas de Playa de Mayo et 
al.1988 p. 15-21)
19The aim with these trials was to get information about what had happened to the victims, even though it was 
not possible to sentence the perpetrators (Filippini 2011 p. 24).
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4.3 The repeal of the amnesty laws and the re-
opening of trials (2001-2006)
From  the  beginning  of  2000,  a  new  era  began  with  regard  to  criminal
accountability.
In 2001 a federal judge declared the amnesty laws unconstitutional, since they
were said to be incompatible with international obligations. Two years later, the
congress passed a law abrogating the earlier amnesty laws.20 Finally, in 2005, the
Supreme Court affirmed the earlier  decision by the federal court and one year
later, the first trial was held (Felippini 2011 p. 46, ICTJ2008 p.1-3).
Since then, many hundreds have been sentenced (Sydsvenskan/TT 2015). In
distinction to the trials during the years of Alfonsín, the aim this time is not only
to put the responsible on the highest level in the military on trial,  but also to
charge many civil actors, such as ex-ministers and judges (Felippini 2011 p. 26,
CELS 2016b).
20Several cases where re-opened the same year as a result of that. (Human rights watch 2014)
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Figure 2: Civilians accused by role. ”Apropiadores” refer to those who adopted  kidnapped 
children. CNU was a group on the extreme right. SIDE was Argentina´s intelligence 
secretariat.
5 The institutions before and after the 
return to democracy
In order to estimate the possible trust-building effect of trials and other measures,
it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  the  different  institutions  were
complicit in the human rights abuses during the dictatorship. 
It  is  also  important  to  see  when  and  to  what  extent  each  institution  was
reformed and reconstructed  from a TJ perspective.
Although these issues are clearly quite complex and a task for historians, for
the purposes of present study the following brief overview should be sufficient.
5.1 The political institutions
The members of the constitutional government of Perón were replaced by military
officers  and officials  “delegated”  by the military  junta  after  the coup in 1976
(Canelo 2013 p. 3).
The  political  institutions  during  the  dictatorship  did  not  only  consist  of
military  officers;  the  junta  also  chose  civil  ministers,  such  as  the  economic
minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, who had earlier been minister under the
leadership of José María  Guido from  Unión Cívica Radical (La Nación 2013,
Unión Cívica Radical 2015).21 
Even though a lot was done by the new political institutions in order to break
with the repressive past immediately after the return to democracy, it is also true
that the military continued to exercise a large political influence for several years
(Canelo  2015).  Also,  even  though  the  attempts  of  some  of  the  highest  top
commanders to make a political career under democracy were rejected, several of
the  former  members  of  the  military  provincial  governments  continued  their
political  careers  during  the  '90s  and in  the  beginning  of  the  '00s,  both  at  the
provincial and national level (Canelo 2015, Canelo 2013 p. 14).
Despite the TJ measures since the return to democracy, different human rights
abuses, such as abuse by the police and the failure to protect indigenous rights,
have  continued  during  the  leaderships  of  democratic  regimes  (Human  Rights
Watch 2014, Lessa 2011 p. 26). Some have even suggested that the TJ measures
taken in recent years are used by the government to detract attention from the
ongoing human rights abuses (Sikkink 2008 p. 2).
21 Martínez de Hoz was later found responsible for the kidnapping of two businessmen (La Nación 2013). 
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5.2 The judiciary
The judiciary in general did little to prevent the human rights abuses committed
during the dictatorship (Lessa 2011 p.  35).  While  some judges simply tried to
adapt  to  the  new  circumstances,  others  also  supported  the  dictatorship  more
actively  by constantly  rejecting  habeas  corpus,  and by allowing  interrogations
made under torture (Gandulfo 2015 p. 120-121, CELS 2015 p. 135-137).
After the return to democracy, the legitimacy of the judiciary was questioned
by  many  citizens,  because  of  their  role  during  the  dictatorship.  In  1984,  all
members of the supreme court, as well as many lower court judges, were replaced
(Canelo 2015, Acuña &Alonso 2015 p. 5). Yet: even today functionaries who have
been accused of complicity in human rights crimes during the dictatorship, remain
in positions within the judiciary (CELS 2015 p. 137).
As well as having been complicit in the human rights abuses, the judiciary,
naturally,  also  have  had  an  important  role  in  the  general  process  of  criminal
accountability. For example, before the amnesty laws, partly because of the role of
the judiciary, the investigations could advance a lot more than what had ever been
the intention of the government (Canelo 2015). Yet, the second wave of trials have
also been criticized for being “subject to delays” (Human rights watch 2014).
5.3 The armed forces
A big  part  of  the  accused  of  crimes  against  humanity  during  the  dictatorship
belonged to the armed forces (as seen in Figure 1 above). Also, according to Paula
Canelo,  a very large percentage of the military were in some way involved in
tortures and other human rights violations (Canelo 2015).
Yet, not only trials but also other measures were taken soon after the transition
to  democracy  in  order  to  permanently  change  the  role  of  the  armed  forces.
Already in the middle of the 1980´s, Alfonsín reduced the role of the armed forces
by retiring at least half of the high command and creating a new structure, where
the  elected  president  of  the  country  became  the  commander-in-chief  and  the
defense minister was the highest commander of the armed forces (Lessa 2011 p.
34).
In 1988 a law was adopted, which provided that the task of the armed forces
would be clearly defined as national  defence only,   and that  the armed forces
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would  not  be  allowed  to  become  involved  in  questions  concerning  internal
security.  Later,  in 1991 and 2001, additional laws with similar objectives were
adopted.22 Finally in 2006, the role of the armed forces was further specified and
limited,  for example in several aspects concerning international  matters (Lessa
2011 p. 34-35, CELS 2015 p. 371-373).
In 2003 44 high officers, who had been in charge during the dictatorship, were
also replaced (Nationalencyklopedin 2013). In addition to the measures made by
the government, there have also been initiatives to deal with the past made by the
members of the military themselves, such as a confession made on television by
the army Chief of Staff, Martín Balsa, in 1995 (Canelo 2015, La Nación 1995).
Yet, there have also been tendencies in the other direction: César Milani, who
is accused of having been involved in human rights abuses during the dictatorship,
was until recently the head of the army in the country (Foxnews 2015).
5.4 The police
Even though the dictatorship was led by the military junta, the police participated
actively and to a great extent in killings and torture (Glanc 2014, CELS 1988).
According to one high official,  the police were used by the military as “cheap
labour for their worst activities” (Hinton 2005 p.80).
But unlike in the military, no reforms were carried out of the police forces at
all  until  the  end of  the 1990's,  and the  attempts  to  reform the  police  have in
general not been particularly successful (Glanc 2014 p. 479, Lessa 2011 p. 39-40,
Hinton 2005 p. 76). 
The attempts that later took place during the governments of Ménem and  De
la Rúa, such as human rights training, increasing the number of the police and the
purging  of  corrupt  elements,  all  had  the  problem  that  they  were  “largely
ephemeral  and  palliative  in  nature,  given  that  they  did  not  address  structural
problems”, according to Hinton (2005 p. 84).
In  2003,  as  Kirchner  became  president,  80  percent  of  the  high  police
command was also purged (Hinton 2005 p. 85).
Yet, ever long after the return to democracy, police violence has remained a
large problem in Argentina, and it includes several severe cases of torture, murder
and disappearances (Bonner 2009 p.227, CELS 2015 p. 24).
22 Even though the law in 1991 did allow the armed forces to get involved in the internal security as a last resort, 
in extreme circumstances. (CELS 2015 p. 371-373)
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5.5 The media
The media has had a diverse role both during the dictatorship and afterwards, with
regard to human rights abuses committed in the past. While some journalists were
themselves  among the victims of the repression,  others were in different  ways
complicit with the crimes committed (Borelli&Saborido 2008 p. 53). While there
was media that was directly linked with the junta (Borelli&Saborido 2008 p. 74),
major national newspapers such as Clarín and La Nación were also complicit in
the sense that they did not report about many of the abuses committed by the
regime.  They  also  benefited  from various  businesses  with  the  junta  (Feld  &
Franco 2015 p. 394).
At the same time, the media has also had a role in the accountability of the
human rights abuses committed in the past.
For many people, it was in 1984, when the media started to report more about
the testimonies of the victims, and the camps, that they became informed about
what had happened during the dictatorship. Yet, according to Claudia Feld, a lot of
the media was not able to explain why the violations had occurred and many times
a  sensationalistic  approach  was  adopted.  It  was  not  until  after  the  truth
commission had released their report and the criminal trials had started that the
abuses were acknowledged more widely. After those key events, a lot of the media
also adapted this discourse (Feld 2015 p.274-275, 310-311).
Since then,  part  of  the media  has  had an  important  role  in  holding actors
accountable for crimes against human rights, for those in the present as well as
those  committed  during  the  dictatorship  23(Peruzzotti  &  Smulovitz  2002  p.
214,221, 226, CELS 2015 p. 130).
23 One clear example of this is when newspapers published lists  in 2010 with the names of thousands of persons 
who had different functions during the dictatorship (CELS 2013 p.130).
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6 Institutional trust 1983-2015
In this section the institutional trust in Argentina will be analysed. The expected
result, assuming that trials  do have a significant influence on the level of trust,
will be compared to the actual survey data.24 These results will also be compared
with the answers from the interviews. 
6.1 General observations about the material
Before  analysing  the  survey  data,  some  general  observations  should  be
mentioned:
 The levels of trust in the Latinobarómetro are constantly higher than in other
surveys from the same years. When comparing Latinobarómetro to World Values
Survey, the methodologies appear to be similar, but one possible reason could be
that the available  alternatives differ a little bit and could therefore be interpreted
differently.  While the available positive answers expressing confidence in the
World Values Surveys are ”a great deal”  and ”quite a lot”  the corresponding
answers  in  Latinobarómetro  are  ”a  lot”  and  ”some”  (Latinobarómetro  2016,
World Values Survey 2016).
 Some of the results from Gallup (1996a), Gallup/La Nación (2001) and World
Values Surveys (2016) are so similar  so that it's  reasonable believe that they
actually derive from the same survey, even though this was not confirmed.
 In the results from Gallup/CIMA (2001) the respondents who did not answer
were not included when the percentage of people that trusted an institution was
calculated.
6.2 General patterns of institutional trust
Before  analysing  each  institution,  some  of  the  more  general  patterns  will  be
described.  What  is  to  be  said  about  the  general  institutional  trust  during  the
different periods of accountability?25
24The media is an exception here, since the trust in this institution is not expected to be significantly influenced 
by the trials.
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 Between 1984 and 1991 there was a significant decrease in the parliament as
well as in the judiciary and in the media. The trust increased in the armed forces
and remained basically the same in the police.
 There is also an up-going trend in all the institutions from 2002 until 2006. This
trend was especially clear between 2003 and 2005 in many institutions. 
 A continued increase after 2006 was only seen in relation to the armed forces
and the police.
Many interviewees described how the first years of democracy where filled with
hope and a general trust in democracy and in the institutions:
“[...]  all  the  confidence,  absolutely.  [...]In  all  the  institutions,  sure.  It  was  the
expectations that everything was going to reform, everything was going to work
better and so on. [...]I believed a lot in what was coming.”26
This was in clear contrast to the years after the amnesty laws and pardons, where
many respondents experienced a widespread pessimism and disappointment in the
institutions, irrespective of political view.
”I was very angry[...] in the sense of not believing in anything”27
“[…]we entered [a process where the institutions deteriorate] from the beginning
of the decade of the nineties. There is a marked increase in the levels of corruption
in all areas.”28
Talking  about  the  present,  the  answers  differed  a  lot  more  concerning  the
institutional trust. The trust in the political institutions, the media and the armed
forces varies a lot, while trust in the police and the justice system has continued to
be low among most of the respondents,  irrespective of political opinion and social
background.
But it may be important to take into account that trust isn't always based only
on the performances of the institutions, but also on expectations, as one woman
said:
“After having lived so many years of dictatorship[…] a democratic government
puts  a  lot  of  expectations[…]as  the  time  goes  by[...]one  ´gets  used´  to  the
democracy so to speak[...]one starts to get to be aware of about other kinds of
errors and problems.”29
25One reason to do this is that the respondents many times talked about the institutions as a whole, rather than as separate units.“The institutions are together, aren’t they?”, as one respondent 
[A6] put it.
26 [A7]
27 [A15]
28 [A1]
29 [A10]
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6.3 Trust in the political institutions
Given that very similar trends in confidence is seen in relation to the government
and  the  congress,  and  that  most  of  the  interviewees  tended  to  associate  the
political  establishment  with  the  government  and  the  president,  they  will  be
analysed together in the same section. 
 As mentioned previously,  there was a huge decrease in the trust in the parliament
between 1984 and 1991 just as would be expected, even though there is no data from
the years in-between.30  
 A gradual decrease in the trust in the parliament as well as in the government was
expected from 1991 until the years of the re-opening of the trials, when trust was
expected to increase gradually.
 This pattern was confirmed in the data for the parliament until 2011, the same year as
Cristina  Kirchner  became  president.  Then  the  trust  decreased,  even  as  the  trials
continued. The expected pattern was seen for the government only until 2003. After
that year it begins to fluctuate in a way that the congress does not.
When trying to remember how they felt about the political institutions during the
first years of democracy, many of the interviewees seemed to associate their high
expectations with the new political institutions in general, and with the president
in particular. Many also expressed their satisfaction with that the top commanders
were going to put on trial.
Yet, after the first time of euphoria, several respondents described how they
started to realize that  a democratic  leadership also has its  failures,  such as an
alleged  inability  to  handle  the  economy,  which  was  an  important  reason why
many of the respondents now started to trust the institutions less than before.
Another important factor that influenced the political trust negatively were the
amnesty laws: 
“It was terrible, […] I felt that this was a betrayal on the popular cause, I felt that
at this moment the government stamped on the memory of the 30 000 disappeared
comrades. […] a slap in the face towards the dignity of The Argentine people.“31
The low level  of political  trust  during the 1990's, as the economical  problems
continued, was also visible in the answers from the respondents.   Corruption, lack
of influence from other political parties than the Peronists, and dependence on the
US were other reasons mentioned. 
In the current situation, the opinions differed a lot more: people were many
times very much in favour of the political institutions or very much against them,
and depending on that either optimistic or pessimistic about the situation in the
30 Unfortunately I have not found any comparable data about the trust in the government during the 80’s and the beginning of 1990’s. Yet, surveys from the 1900’s about how much people 
believe in the ability of the president and the government to govern the country and solve problems, show an escalating discontent until 1996.  This discontent seems to have at least some 
connection with the economy, which, according to the surveys were among the greatest concerns on the citizens. (Gallup 1996b, Gallup 1996c, Graciela Römer y Asociados 1996b, 1996c, Centro 
de estudios de opinión pública/Clarín 1994)
31 [A13]
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country. Many of those who were in favour of the government said that they had
“taken back what Ménem sold” and that they represented the people in a way that
earlier governments had not been able too.
Among those who did not trust the government and other political institutions
much, forms of corruption was perhaps the most common reason, and many also
said  that  they  did  not think  that  politicians  represented  the  people.  This  was
especially  true  when  talking  to  the  two  respondents  from  the  indigenous
communities, who said that they felt totally excluded and discriminated by all the
institutions, but perhaps by the government in particular:
“Children will soon be dying of hunger[or]because they have cancer[...]Argentina
is in a military dictatorship.[...]in 1978 the[...]military killed you, now Cristina
kills you with a slow death”32
The trials – and other transitional justice reforms, were also very much associated
with the government: those who were in favour of the government were in general
also those who were in favour of the trials. One woman, whose uncle disappeared
during the dictatorship, said she trusted the government a lot, and that the trials
were the major reason for this. But there were also exceptions. Some respondents
were in favour of the trials, but thought that the government also used them as a
way to improve their image. 
“[...]it bothers me that this government uses[...]the human rights as politics. I don't
think it's politics, it's something natural[…]You do it because it's right, and not in
order to fish for votes. “33
 
32 [A11]
33 [A2]
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Figure 3: Percentage of respondents that trust the government
Figure 4: Percentage of respondents that trust the congress
6.4 Trust in the judiciary
 The significant decrease in trust in the judiciary between 1984 and 1991, was as
could be expected.
 The trust would also be expected to gradually decrease even more during the
1990's, while increasing gradually to some extent from the middle of the 1990's,
as the truth trials  started.   The trust  was then expected to gradually increase
further, as the re-opening of the trials begun.
 The expected pattern was to be seen in the data until 2010. After that, the trust
started to decrease, despite the fact that the trials continued. 
When  talking  to  my  respondents,  different  kinds  of  corruption  was  the  main
reason mentioned for the lack of confidence during the 1990s.34 as well as today. 
“It got too politicized and it really remains the same as during the dictatorship” 35
“The justice for the poor person is very unfair.[...] For us it's a lot more difficult to
gain even a minimum of justice.” 36
“The justice is absolutely biased.”37
 
“The justice is a justice for...The powerful ones.”38
That some judges from the dictatorship was still  in charge was another reason
mentioned.
It’s  worth  to  note  that  even  some  of  those  who  were  in  favour  of  the
government and the reopening of the trials, did not trust the judiciary in general.
They rather  seemed  to  associate  the  trials  with  the  government  than  with  the
judiciary. Also, one woman explicitly said that the trials had nothing to do with the
confidence in the justice system, even though she was in favour of them:
“It has nothing to do with it for me.[...]The lack of confidence is because of the
things that daily happen since long ago and which haven't been solved.[…]”39
In one case when the trials  were closely associated by the interviewee with the
justice system, the level of trust was affected negatively. This person said he knew
an accused military, who had been detained for eight years without that his case
had been tried: 
34The low trust during the 1990's was also visible in other surveys from this period: When people were to rank the different institutions in 95 and 96, the justice
system was in the bottom. (Graciela Römer/La Nación 1996) 
35 [A14]
36 [A8]
37 [A1]
38 [A12]
39 [A2]
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“[...]even people that in general are considered to be descent, like for example
some members  in the supreme court[…] In front of this  situation they haven't
done anything, nor said anything.”40
40[A1]
30
Figure 5: Percentage of respondents that trust the judiciary
6.5 Trust in the armed forces
Not very surprisingly, the confidence in the armed forces was very low one year
after the fall of the dictatorship.
 Since  important  reforms  were  made  in  the  military  in  1989,  it  is  also  not
surprising  that  the  trust  was  higher  in  1991,  even  with  amnesty  laws  and
pardons. Yet, this increase was probably higher than expected,  given that the
amnesties to a great extent was a result of threats by the military.
 During the 90s, trust was expected to remain on the same level until the second
half of the 90s, when the trust was expected to gradually rise, due to the rise of
different accountability measures, and official confessions made by the military.
This  trust  was  expected  to  gradually  increase  further  from the  beginning  of
2000, as the trials were re-opened and further reforms were made. 
 Counter  to  the  expected  result,   trust  seems  to  have  decreased  during  the
beginning of the 1990's. As expected there is an increase from 1995, but the trust
after that fluctuates a lot. 
 From 2003,  there  seems  to  be  a  gradual  increase  in  the  trust,  as  would  be
expected. 
From the  interviewees  explanations,  it  became  clear  how people's  trust  in  an
institution  is  based  on  experiences  from the  past  and  the  present,  as  well  as
expectations  about  the  future.  Some  –  especially  those  who  had  personal
experiences from the dictatorship – still found it difficult to trust the armed forces
because of the past. 41 The fact that Milani, who has been accused of taking part in
the abuses during the dictatorship, still was the highest leader in the armed forces
when these interviews were being conducted, was also mentioned.
But others didn’t know weather to trust the armed forces or not, since their
power has decreased dramatically. Because of that, many interviewees expressed
their (very different) opinions about the  role of the armed forces rather than its
performances nowadays:
“There isn't any institution of the armed forces any more[...]it may exist as name
but  not  with  the  function  that  the  armed  forces  should  have  to  defend  the
country.”42
“The big advantage is that like [...] repressive apparatus, the [...]armed forces have
in practice disappeared.”43
41The war of the Malvinas was also mentioned by several respondents and seemed to influence the trust in both a 
negative and positive way, depending on  how the acting of the military during the war was perceived by the 
respondent. 
42 [A2]
43 [A14]
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6.6 Trust in the police
 Trust was expected to be lower in 1991 than in 1984, because of the combination
of amnesties and lack of reforms in the police. Instead, the level of trust was
almost the same in 1991. 
 The trust  was then expected  to  gradually decrease further  during the 1990's.
From the beginning of 2000 the trust was expected to gradually increase, due to
the combination of reforms and re-opening of trials.
 As expected, the trust did continue to decrease during the 1990's- even though
this decrease was a lot more dramatic than expected. 44
 From 2003, there is a gradual increase in the trust, as expected, even though it
continues to be very low.
 
All the interviewees said that they had very little or no trust in the police. While a
few  of  them  distrusted  the  police  as  a  phenomenon,45 regardless  of  the
performance, most based their distrust on their own experiences. Corruption and
44 In the end of the 1990's and the beginning of 2000, the results fluctuate a lot though. 
45 One respondent said that he police was the same everywhere in the world while a woman said that she didn’t 
trust any institution in the capitalist system.
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Figure 6: Percentage of citizens that trust the armed forces
involvement in different crimes were the most common reasons for the distrust.
Another reason mentioned was the experienced inefficiency of the police and its
alleged inability to protect its citizens:46
“They see the children, they are robbing in the street. They [the policemen] are
just half a step away and they do nothing, nothing.”47
Some also mentioned an inability of the police to break with their role during the
dictatorship.  One woman said the police would have to ”abandon the practices
that they have always had” if order to become more trustworthy: 
”We all know that here in Argentina in the prisons[...]People are killed.[...]  ill-
treated[...]I suppose that they are probably still torturing in some cases.”4849
 
46Similar patterns were to be seen during the 1990's. 85 percent said that they did not feel protected and 44 
percent of them said it was because of corruption or that they did not trust the police. (Centro de estudios de 
opinión pública/Clarín 1996).
47 [A5]
48 [A10]
49 Similar answers were to be find in the surveys from the 1990's.  Among those who had no or little confidence 
in the police, the majority said it was because of abuse of authority. (Graciela y Römer 1996d).The continued 
existence of torture in Argentina does not seem to have been unfamiliar to the citizens during the 1990's either: 
about two thirds of the asked people thought that torture was still used, while the majority did not think that it 
was justified. Even though this survey did not specify if the torture was being used by the police (Página 30) 
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Figure 7: Percentage of respondents that trust the police
6.7 Trust in the media
 The confidence  in  the press decreased  significantly between 1984 and 1991,
Since then, the confidence has been re-established to some extent, but is still
low. This is also true concerning television, where there weren't many trends to
be seen, since 1995, when the question was first asked. 
 Another observation done was a clear pattern that the confidence in both the
television  and the press increased  to  a great  extent  between 1995 and 1996,
while decreasing in the political institutions, the judiciary and the police. 
The  answers  from  the  interviewees  did  not  give  many  clues  to  explain  the
patterns of trust in the media..  Rather,  their  answers indicated the difficulty in
even  trying  to  analyse  the  media  as  one  institution,  as  there  is  such  a  great
diversity.  Yet,  some  other  patterns  were  to  be  seen,  e.g.  that  many  had  the
perception that media in general was tendentious, biased or even lied, and some
also expressed that they trusted media less now than before.50
The media was also perceived to be very politicized nowadays, and the trust or
distrust was very much connected to whether the interviewee sympathized with
the government, the opposition or with no clear political ideology.
A few of the respondents also mentioned Clarin´s role during the dictatorship
as a reason as to why they did not trust media in general.
Despite the general distrust in media, few people seemed to disbelieve in all
media. As one man said:
“[...]if one knows who to listen to, one can become well-informed.”51
50 Some expressed this without specifying exactly when their trust in the media decreased. But one woman 
expressed clearly that she believed in the media in the 1980’s, unlike what she did nowadays.
51[A1]
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Figure 8: Percentage of respondents that trust the press
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
World Values 
Survey
Gallup
Latinobarómetro
Gallup/CIMA
Figure 9: Percentage of respondents that trust the television
6.8 First trials and institutional trust
Though the relation  between the  trials  and institutional  trust  has  already been
mentioned several times, its relation to the general level of institutional trust needs
to be considered. Factors such as moral conceptions and information about the
abuses will also be taken into account.
Most  of  the  interviewees  who were  old  enough already knew a  lot  about  the
abuses when the dictatorship ended.
Yet,  the truth commission and some reports  from the media confirmed the
information that had already been circulating, and gave more details about it. At
the same time, not everyone found the information credible.
One person, born in a military family, said that he thought the information in
the truth commission was very exaggerated. While most of the others in the study
totally condemned the acts of the state during the dictatorship, his attitude was
also more ambiguous: after a summary judgement of a military tribunal, you can
shoot a person who have committed “horrible blood crimes” he said, but the body
should always be returned to the family:
“You don't make [him/her] disappear.[…] I'm not saying that I would have been
less hard, but I would have done some things differently[…] I´m talking about
other methods.”52 
Others, while condemning the human rights violations of the military still rather
viewed the dictatorship as a war between two parts53 or/and stressed that human
rights crimes were committed by the left-wing guerilla too, and that they should
also be punished.
Irrespective of conceptions about the abuses during the dictatorship, there was
a deep consensus that the trials of the military were at least necessary.54 Several
also said that it had influenced their trust:
“It was something fantastic.[...] It was what the whole society had been asking
for.”55
“I felt good, because it  was a vindication of the whole society.  [..]It  was very
important.”56
Some  were  more  neutral,  while  no  one  believed  the  trials  had  affected  their
confidence in a negative way. 
52[A1]
53Also [A1] perceived it rather as a war.
54Even though some thought that the amount of trials were too limited.
55 [A8]
56 [A13]
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6.9 The amnesties and institutional trust
Many  described  how  the  amnesties  and  the  pardons  had  affected  their  trust
negatively.  This  was  especially  true  among  those  who  were  directly  affected
during the dictatorship, but also among several others:
“It was horrible[...]a lot of anger a lot of[...]impotence[…] But well, it was not
surprising that it happened [...]what surprises here is the justice”57
”You are legalizing something which is illegal as a concept from the beginning. If
it's bad to torture and kill […] and you violated these rules and then you put other
rules which say that you forgive this...That's so mad […] so that it's opposite to be
able to understand it or believe in the institutions.”58
Some were more neutral, while none of the respondents said that it had affected
their trust in a positive way.
6.10 The re-opening of the trials and institutional 
trust
The interviews showed no consensus about the second waves of trials, such as
about the trials in 1985.
Those who said that they had affected their trust positively all had political
opinions to the left.  This was sometimes also very directly connected with the
government, while others talked about a more general confidence in society.
”[...]when these questions were regulated from the institutions it gives you a
lot more confidence to be able to talk about them[...] It gave you permission to be
able to speak about it more openly[…]” 59
A man also said that rather than trust in the institutions, the trials created self-
confidence in the people:  
“Yes, the trust was re-established but in the sense of the capacity of the people to
demand things”60
57 [A10]
58 [A15]
59 [A10]
60 [A13]
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For  others,  the  ability  of  the  institutions  to  deal  with  the  past  was  not
connected to their trust at all: 
“They  were  already  very  old  people.[…]I  saw  it  as  if  it  was  because  of
revenge[…] as if all this meant going back to the same, fighting once more[…]
And to always remain in the same place”61
“They [the trials] don't work because they [the representatives of the institutions]
are all bought”62
61 [A3]
62 [A11]
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7 Analysis & suggestions for further 
research
As  mentioned  before,  this  study  is  not  extensive  enough  to  allow  definite
conclusions about the relationship between trials and trust to be drawn. Yet, the
results  provide  strong  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  trials  do,  under  certain
circumstances, play a crucial role in restoring or creating institutional trust. 
An interesting pattern can for example be seen when comparing the level of
trust between 1984 and 1991, as the trust in the parliament and the justice system
decreases dramatically in only a few years. 
 Another pattern that would be interesting to investigate further, is the gradual
increase of trust in several institutions from the beginning of 2000, when the trials
were re-opened and also other TJ measures were implemented. 
There may obviously be many incidental  factors that influence the level of
institutional  trust  here.  The economy is  one factor  that,  according to  both the
interviews and surveys, seems to be of importance. Knowing that Argentina was
in a huge economic crisis in the beginning of 2000, means we must be cautious
about drawing conclusions about the specific effect of the trials. Yet, the fact that
the trust also increased in other institutions, which are not probable to be primarily
associated with the economy, does suggest that the trials, in combination with the
reforms, may have had a significant effect as well.
The importance of the trials was also frequently emphasized in the interviews,
as we have seen above. Yet, the possible influence seem to differ greatly between
the different institutions, depending – it seems – to what extent each institution
has been able to reform and break with its repressive past in more general terms. 
This pattern is perhaps especially visible with regard to the justice system.
Even though the level of trust was very high during the years of the first trials, this
trust  has  eroded  and  remained  continuously  low  after  1991,  despite  several
measures  taken  by  the  judiciary  in  order  to  hold  the  former  perpetrators
accountable also after the first wave of trials. 
Furthermore, as even those who were in favour of the trials expressed little
trust in the judiciary, this trust – at least nowadays – does not seem to have been
very influenced by the trials, in opposite to what was the case in the political
institutions, according to the interviews. 
This illustrates the difficulties mentioned in much of the research literature,
when  institutions  which  still  are  not  thoroughly  democratically  reformed,  and
which are not conceived as independent, are made responsible for holding actors
accountable for serious human rights crimes. The risk that the trials in these cases
are suspected of having been politically influenced, was also seen in several of the
interviews  concerning  the  re-opening  of  the  trials.  The  fact  that  part  of  the
judiciary was also complicit in crimes during the dictatorship is a factor which
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could further increase this risk. This raises the question if a certain amount of trust
in the institutions which are responsible for the accountability is perhaps also a
pre-condition in order for the trials to create further trust in those institutions.
When looking at the institutions which were directly involved in the abuses –
the police and the armed forces –  it is interesting to see that the trust nowadays is
higher in the armed forces, which were primarily responsible, than in the police.
The general trend is also that the trust in the armed forces appears to gradually
increase since the end of the dictatorship (despite being continuously low) while
the  trust  in  the  police  was  even  lower  during  the  90´s  than  shortly  after  the
dictatorship.  This,  again,  seems to point  towards the importance of reforms in
order to re-establish the trust.
Since the reforms have been stressed so much here as a mean to create trust,
and since the media, which can exercise another kind of accountability, is at least
partly trusted: Could it be criminal accountability isn't necessary? 
The findings from the interviews indicate that the criminal accountability do
fill  needs  of  affected  citizens  which  are  not  easily  substituted  by  other  TJ
measures or other forms of accountability. One of those is the need of vindication,
or, which is closely related, ”to get the dignity back” as written in the literature.
It is also important to observe that several interviewees made clear that the
absence of criminal accountability had effected their trust.
Finally, some words should be said about why the trust in the judiciary and the
parliament appears to have been much higher during the first wave of trials than
during the second one, which is confirmed by the interviews which showed that
the first trials were widely accepted. Why does the perception of these two waves
of trials seem to differ? 
The passing of time is clearly one factor to take into account: the time since
the abuses were committed, but also the experience of living in a democracy. The
recurrence  of  human  rights  abuses  and impunity  during  democracy is  another
factor  which make later  trials  for crimes in the past  appear  less significant  or
sometimes even hypocritical.  The number of trials is another issue to take into
account. 
There  are  also  several  general  patterns  that  would  be  interesting  to  examine
further. First of all, the indications that trials may influence the institutional trust
would be interesting to test empirically on a greater number of countries, as well
as to further investigate how institutional reforms and trials may be related. How
the trials may influence inter-personal trust is another relevant question, as well as
to more in detail examine how trust may be affected when former perpetrators
remain in powerful positions.
Since  trust  in  key  institutions,  more  than  30  years  after  the  return  to
democracy,  continues to be at such low levels in Argentina, this issue requires
further study from different angels, and should also provide some concern; even
though  a  certain  distrust  in  the  democratic  institutions  should  be  natural  and
healthy,  the  levels  in  Argentina  seem  to  imply  that  democracy  in  its  wider
40
definition  – though significant  improvements  has  been made – still  isn't  quite
working.  
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Appendix 1: Guiding questions in the 
interviews
The institutions today:
How much do you trust the political system? What are the reasons for the trust/ What
are the reasons for the lack of trust?
How credible do you find the politicians in the parliament and the government? Why do
you think that a lot of people don't believe in the politicians?/ Was there anything in
particular that made you believe less in the politicians?
How much do you trust the police? Was there anything that the police did that made you
get  more  confidence?  /What  could  the  police  do  in  order  to  make  you  trust  the
institution more?
Do you have the same opinion about the whole justice system? Why?
How much do you believe in the media in general? What does the media do which is
good? Do you think the same about all media?/ Was there anything in particular which
made you believe less in the media?
The institutions 1983-1986
After the dictatorship fell, where did you live? Where did you work?
When the truth commission came and the media had more possibilities to report about
the abuses done during the dictatorship, do you remember how you felt and what you
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were thinking? Was this new information to you?/How did you get to know about the
abuses?
During this time, the trials against the military also started. What did you think when
you heard of them? How did this affect your confidence in the institutions that we were
talking about before?
The institutions 1986-1991 
When they created the amnesty laws, do you remember what you thought? 
And when they pardoned ex-perpetrators like Videla, how did you feel?
How did this affect your trust in the institutions that we were talking about before?
The institutions 2001- 2006
When they took away the amnesty laws and the trials  started again,  what was your
reaction? Why? 
General questions
Is there anything else about this subject which you would like to add?
Where are you from?
Are you married? What does your wife/husband do?
What is/ was the profession of your parents?
On a political scale where 1 would be very much to the left and 10 very much to the
right, what would be your position? 
What is your level of education?
How much money do you approximately earn each month?
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Appendix 2: List of respondents
A1 Man, 65 years old. Married, children and grandchildren.  Is engineer and has also
worked as a political advisor. Comes from a military family. Political opinions to the
center-right.
A2 Woman, 34 years old. Not married. Works in external business. University degree.
Parents worked at a journey and car agency. No clear political ideology. 
A3 Man, 67 years old. Widower with children and grandchildren. Retired, used to work
as  accountant  in  a  consult  company.  Father  worked  as  a  milkman,  mother  was  a
housewife. Political opinions to the center-right. 
A4 Woman, 34 years old. Not married. University degree. Father lawyer and mother an
academic. Uncle disappeared during the dictatorship. Political opinions to the center-left
(Peronist)
A5 Woman 33 years old. Not married. Works as a secretary.  Political opinions to the
right. 
A6 Man, 46 years old. Married. Works as a publisher and as an English teacher at the
university. Father businessman, mother academic. Political opinions to the left.
A7  Woman  55  years  old.  Married.  Works  at  a  culturalcenter.  Father  businessman,
mother housewife. Political opinions to the centre.
A8 Man 63 years old. Divorced with children. Lives in the slum. Political opinions to
the left.
A9 Man 55 years old. Leader of one of the indigenous communities in a province of
Argentina. 
A10 Woman 61 years old. Divorced with daughter. Works as a nurse. Was forced into
exile during the dictatorship. Political opinions to the left.
A11 Man 43 years old. Belongs to the indigenous community. 
A12 Woman  60 years  old.  Married  with  children.  Works  as  an  architect.   Political
opinions to the left.
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A13  Man  65  years  old.  Works  as  a  sociologist.  Was  forced  into  exile,  sister  got
kidnapped and was tortured during the dictatorship. Working class-background. Political
opinions to the left. 
A14 Man 60 years old. Married with children. Works as an architect. Political opinions
to the left.
A15 Woman 45 years old. Divorced with children. Works as a psychologist. Political
opinions to the left. 
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